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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1988, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) granted the first
patent on a "nonnaturally occurring non-human multicellular living
organism" :' a mouse genetically engineered to be particularly susceptible
to cancer.2 Although Congress had earlier provided limited protection for
certain cultivated plants,3 bioengineered animals-ranging from single-
celled bacteria to mammals and amphibians-were barred from patent
protection on ethical and moral grounds. In 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court
1. The PTO uses this phrase to define patentable subject material for living creatures. See
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE NOTICE: ANIMALS-PATENTABILrTY, reprinted in 1077 OFFICIAL
GAZETTE U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 8 (Apr. 21, 1987). This term is the only formal
definition that the PTO provides on the topic.
2. See U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (Apr. 12, 1988). For additional discussion of this patent.
commonly known as the "Harvard mouse," see SHELDON KRIMSKY, BIOTECHNICS & SOCIEM:
THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL GENETICS 44-45 (1991); David Manspeizer, The Cheshire Cat, the
March Hare, and the Harvard Mouse: Animal Patents Open Up a New Genetically-Engineered
Wonderland, 43 RUTGERs L. REv. 417 (1991); and Elizabeth Corcoran, A Tiny Mouse Came
Forth, Sci. AM., Feb. 1989, at 73.
3. See Plant Variety Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (1994)); Plant Patent Act, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 804
(1952) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (1994)). The current debate over live-
organism patents centers primarily on genetically altered animals-in particular, multicellular
animals. There remain, however, biodiversity and environmental concerns over the use of patent
protection to encourage the development of genetically altered plants. See, e.g., Ned Hettinger,
Patenting Life: Biotechnology, Intellectual Property, and Environmental Ethics, 22 B.C. ENvT_
AFF. L. REv. 267, 268-69 (1995); Terri A. Jones, Note, Patenting Transgenic Animals: When the
Cat's Away, the Mice Will Play, 17 VT. L. REv. 875,877 (1993).
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drew upon a growing trend in the law to allow patents for "anything under
the sun that is made by man," 4 thereby opening the universe of patentable
subject matter to living organisms. The Court, however, failed to define the
boundaries of this new area of patent doctrine, choosing instead to induce
the fledgling biotechnology industry to draw policymakers into the issue.
But Congress and the PTO tacitly refused to address the growing concerns
and let the question of animal patentability go unresolved. As a result, over
6000 biotechnology patent applications were filed, which were then held in
limbo until the PTO's 1988 action.'
The PTO's decision to grant the mouse patent was its second attempt to
force Congress or the courts to end the tumultuous and confusing decade-
long struggle over animal patentability. In response to the PTO's new
policy, a flood of legal and political challenges flowed from numerous
special interest groups that feared the detrimental moral and economic
effects such patents could have on nature and society.6 In 1991, the PTO
obtained partial closure on the issue when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit consolidated and disposed of the legal challenges,
dismissing the claims for lack of standing.7 Although the Federal Circuit
failed to address any questions of morality or law effectively, its conclusion
cleared the way for the PTO's declaration that bioengineered animals and
plants were appropriate subject matter for patent protection, provided that
they met the traditional standards set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 101.8 Both the
4. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting the 1952 congressional joint
committee report reviewing the various sections of the Patent Act of 1793).
5. See Rick Weiss, How Do You Patent a New Elephant, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1987, at C3.
6. For discussions of the response to the PTO's decision, see generally Michael B. Landau.
Multicellular Vertebrate Mammals as "Patentable Subject Matter" Under 35 U.S.C. § 101:
Promotion of Science and the Useful Arts or an Open Invitation for Abuse?, 97 DICK. L. REV. 203
(1993); Matthew McGovern, Note, Biotechnology and the Patenting of Living Organisms, 3
ANIMAL L. 221 (1997); Carrie F. Walter, Note, Beyond the Harvard Mouse: Current Patent
Practice and the Necessity of Clear Guidelines in Biotechnology Patent Law. 73 INn. L.J. 1025
(1998); Michael E. Sellers, Case Note, Patenting Nonnaturally Occurring, Man-Made Life: A
Practical Look at the Economic, Environmental, and Ethical Challenges Facing "Animal
Patents," 47 ARK. L. REV. 269 (1994); and Jack Miller, The Right To Engineer New Creatures,
TORONTO STAR, May 30, 1987, at M3.
7. See Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 922-25 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Although the Federal Circuit disposed of the case by ruling that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
challenge the granting of animal patents, the Quigg court saw that it was equally necessary to
settle the subject-matter question, expressing, in dicta scattered throughout the opinion, the view
that animals were indeed patentable. See id.
8. The Federal Circuit's holding in Quigg created a procedural void regarding standing. It is
unclear who, if anyone, could challenge the PTO's action. Because the animal-rights activists
were not directly harmed by the PTO's actions, they were barred from bringing such claims. In
theory, the biotechnologists benefiting from the new rules were the only people eligible for
remedies under the Quigg court's analysis. One could make the argument that the animals are the
parties actually harmed, but no one can claim standing on their behalf. Thus, it appears unrealistic
that a valid claim will ever be brought under the Quigg regime. Although other groups opposing
animal patents have tried, no challenge has procedurally gone as far as Quigg, and no attempt has
come close to overturning its basic holding.
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Federal Circuit and the PTO relied heavily on the Supreme Court's earlier
opinion and did little to clarify the guidelines or definitions for
patentability. They merely established a case-by-case review process that
gave the PTO arbitrary discretion over the factors it would consider in
determining acceptable subject matter. This system, akin to the ill-
constructed "I know it when I see it" analysis that Justice Potter Stewart
employed for pornography,9 remains the regime under which patent review
for bioengineered organisms operates today.'"
Despite the lack of systemic clarity, the basic question of animal and
plant patentability appeared to be settled. Yet as of July 1999, the PTO
faced a backlog of new applications and old appeals, due in part to the lack
of established guidelines. Among the thousands of pending biotechnology
patent applications, the PTO had received over 1900 patent applications
specifically for genetically altered animals and had approved fewer than ten
percent." And among those applications, the PTO received one highly
controversial application: a request for a patent on the process by which
scientists can create "chimeras," hybrid organisms that are part animal and
part human.' 3  The PTO recently denied this request, citing the
government's rigid moral ban against patents on human beings.' " But this
test case reopened old wounds, exposing the lack of defined standards and
the PTO's inability to address such questions within a clear and reasoned
framework.'5 The chimera case uncovered one important development in
9. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
10. See infra Section Il.C.
11. See Rochelle K. Seide & Janet M. MacLeod, Drafting Claims for Biotechnological
Inventions, 585 PAT., COPYRIGHTS, & LITERARY PROP. 381, 388 (1999) ("There are 237
unexamined applications, 92 allowed applications, 16 applications on appeal to the PTO Board of
Appeals, 10 applications at the Board of Interferences and 424 applications in active
prosecution.").
12. See id. at 388 n.10 (noting that among the transgenic animals patented are 106 mice, 9
rats, 9 rabbits, 8 sheep, 8 pigs, 8 cows, 7 goats, and one each of a nematode, bird, fish, guinea pig,
abalone, canine, and turkey hen). Patent applications for transgenic animals are approved at a rate
slightly lower than that of most other patent categories. Although 80% of all first-time patent
applications are rejected, transgenic animal patents are rejected at a 94% rate. See Paul Recer,
Patent Application Begs the Question: What Is a Human?, LEGAL INTELUGENCER, June 21,
1999, at4.
13. See Thomas A. Magnani, The Patentability of Human-Animal Chimeras. 14 BERKELEY
TECH. LJ. 443 (1999); Eliot Marshall, Legal Fight over Patents on Life; Duo Aims To Provoke
Debate over Patents Involving Human Tissue, 284 SCIENCE 2067 (1999); Recer, supra note 12;
Allen Salkin, "Mad" Scientist: Ban Frankensteins, N.Y. POST, June 7. 1998, at 35. The patent
applicants had not actually developed such a creature, but made the request as a test case to force
the PTO to define the standards of review for transgenic animals. See Marshall. supra. at 2067.
The applicants, Professors Stuart Newman and Jeremy Rifkin, are opposed to the patenting of life
in general and hoped, at the very least, that their chimera application would cause policymakers to
formulate a set of detailed policies that better define the process by which a live-organism-patent
application is reviewed. See Salkin, supra.
14. See Marshall, supra note 13, at 2067; Recer, supra note 12.
15. See Jenna Greene, He's Not Just Monkeying Around, LEGAL TIMtES, Aug. 16, 1999, at 17.
The denial of the chimera patent was based, in part, on the PTO's conclusion that the organism
lacked utility. This conclusion is questionable given that animals expressing human characteristics
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contemporary patent law: It revealed that the issue is no longer whether
animals and plants can be patented, but which animals and plants should
receive patent protection.
In light of this controversy, the government's failure to resolve the
questions surrounding live-organism patents appears to have had two new
effects. First, it has left some room for debate over the fundamental
propriety (not legality) of permitting plant and animal patents. Opponents
of such patents argue that the absence of standards underscores the
complexity and tenuous nature of patenting life; consequently, they argue,
the PTO should suspend its practice, at least until Congress revises the law
to regulate the powerful effects that modem technology can have on the
development of new plants and animals. 6 Second, the lack of standards has
led to confusion over which organisms qualify for patent protection. The
lack of doctrinal clarity generally takes two forms: (1) patent applications
refused by the PTO for unclear reasons; and (2) patents granted for
organisms that would not meet even the basic legal standards of prior art
and obviousness upon which the PTO and courts have always relied.'7
These factors have combined to create the backlog of applications and
appeals pending in the patent system.
This Note attempts to address the need for clear standards by proposing
the introduction of rules and tests based on the principles of evolutionary
biology. Evolutionary biology can generally be defined as the study of
species' development through their interaction with the environment. It is
based on Charles Darwin's theory of natural selection."8 Darwin
hypothesized that life developed through a process of competition between
and within species. In any given natural environment, 9 species can thrive
or perish, thereby allowing nature to select certain organisms for survival
make better research subjects because their test results provide a more accurate measure of the
actual effects that can be expected on humans. See Recer, supra note 12. This inconsistency in the
PTO's argument undermines much of its opinion.
16. For an excellent summary of these issues and concerns, see Mark 0. Hatfield, From
Microbe to Man, 1 ANIMAL L. 5 (1995). More radical opponents may never be satisfied with any
law or regulatory regime that allows the patenting of plants and animals.
17. Nonobviousness and novelty are two basic requirements for a successful patent
application. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK & RELATED STATE
DOCTRINES: CASES & MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 400-51 (4th ed.
1997). Anyone seeking a patent must prove that his or her invention has not already been invented
(novelty) and is not merely an obvious modification of an existing product (nonobviousness).
Thus, a product of nature already exists, and some modifications on a natural product may appear
to be obvious developments.
18. See CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (J.W. Burrow ed., Penguin Books 1985)
(1859).
19. As is commonly understood, organisms that thrive in one environment may perish in
another. Thus, polar bears would be selected for in the arctic but selected against in the desert.
The environment in which the bioengineered organism is evaluated should be one in which its
progenitors naturally occurred. To use the example again, one would not test a transgenic polar
bear's survival or selection rate in a desert environment.
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and others for extinction. A single trait or a collection of traits may lead to
the selection of one species over another, and, within a particular species,
the mutation of a single trait may result in the creation of a new species that
would supplant the existing one through a process of interbreeding.
Evolutionary biology then draws upon the fields of population ecology,
genetics, and predictive modeling to form an integrated methodology for
describing the evolutionary history and potential of a given organism.'
Although the integration of evolutionary biology seems to be an
obvious step in the development of the law of plant and animal patents, an
extensive search of the legal and scientific literature reveals scant reference
to anything that resembles Darwin's idea and the science it spawned.2'1 This
omission is stunning. Over the last half-century, genetic technology has
redefined the scope of human power over nature and the basic building
blocks of life. Biotechnology has harnessed this power to "create"
organisms that this world has never seen before. The introduction of new
organisms into our environment inevitably changes the biological
landscape. Evolution is the organized and reasoned process of such
changes. Thus, the inclusion of this scientific theory should provide, in its
basic form, a framework upon which we may build a mode of analysis that
will shift patent law away from the ad hoc and toward the logical.
Evolutionary biology offers a tested foundation where there currently is
none and is, therefore, superior to the current system.
Through the application of evolutionary biology, the functional
elements of natural selection and population ecology can be applied to the
analysis of animal and plant patentability. Employing evolutionary biology,
this Note proposes that patents be granted only on those nonnaturally
occurring organisms that exist in some tangible form and that are
theoretically favored due to the intervention of, and their utility to,
humans.' It argues, in essence, that patentable organisms should be defined
20. For a general discussion of the theory and its constituent parts. see FRANCISCO J. AYALA,
POPULATION AND EVOLUTIONARY GENErICS (1982); BIODIVERSITY (E.O. Wilson ed.. 1988);
STEPHEN CROALL & WILLIAM RANKIN, ECOLOGY FOR BEGINNERS (1982); PAUL EHRLICH &
ANNE EHRLICH, EXTINCTION: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF
SPECIES (1981); DOUGLAS J. FUTUYMA, EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY (2d cd. 1986); BILL
McKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE (1989); JONATHAN MILLER & BORIN VAN LOON. DARWIN
FOR BEGINNERS (1982); RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE: A HISTORY OF
ENVIRONMENTALETHICS (1989); and EDWARD O. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE (1992).
21. Perhaps the political nature of the issue, combined with its scientific complexity, leads to
a confusion that welcomes the introduction of these principles, but simultaneously raises anxiety
about their impact on the overall patent system. Put differently, policymakers may feel
unequipped to resolve the controversy because of their ignorance about the potential solutions. At
least one recent commentator has observed a broad, growing discomfort with the use of science in
legal inquiry. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN
THE LAW 197-204 (1999). The absence of evolutionary biology from the patent literature is
discussed further in Part II of this Note.
22. Utility is another fundamental requirement for a successful patent application. Patents are
granted only to inventions that have some use. In the case of live-organism patents, utility to man
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as nonnaturally occurring plants and animals whose prospects for continued
existence are predicated not upon their selection by nature, but upon their
selection by people.
Part II of this Note recounts the development of the legal standards
regarding animal and plant patents. Part III then introduces the proposal for
applying evolutionary biology and discusses its utility in the patent-
application process. In particular, Part III employs the theory in order to
evaluate the role that human intervention plays in the development and
survival of genetically altered organisms. Part HI also discusses the
methods by which evolutionary biology can be injected into the existing
patent-review process and weighs the advantages and disadvantages that
would result from the use of these scientific principles. Part IV concludes
this study by reasserting the value of evolutionary biology in addressing
many of the deficiencies in the current doctrine, including those raised in
the chimera controversy.
At the outset, an important caveat bears mentioning: This Note does not
directly address the moral and ethical concerns that have dominated the
debate over animal and plant patents. Rather, this Note offers a reform of
the troubled patent-application process, notwithstanding the moral
objections. The proposal assumes that the PTO will continue to issue
patents on living organisms regardless of the outcome of the chimera case
or the ongoing objections of the opposition. Property interests and the value
to scientific inquiry appear to be such weighty incentives that the debate
may never come to a complete resolution. 3
Instead of becoming mired in moral and ethical controversy, this Note
addresses real and immediate deficiencies in the patent-application process.
These problems are systemic, requiring detailed attention that opponents
and proponents of live-organism patents seem unwilling to give them at this
time. In the meantime, it is this Note's contention that the PTO is
erroneously issuing patents on organisms that are, or would be, the products
of nature. The proposal offered here is an attempt to rectify this situation.
At the very least, this Note seeks to expose the need for more rigorous
scientific assessment in the process by showing that the current case-by-
case patent-application evaluation, employing vague standards of review, is
insufficient to deal with biotechnological developments.
is a required element as well. As will be discussed in Part III, the utility standard is used as an
essential element in the assessment of the patentability of an invention. This Note proposes that
patents be granted only to those organisms that exist and survive because of their utility to man.
23. Cf. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 710 F. Supp. 728, 730 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
(discussing the growing economic importance of biotechnology in the United States and the
Chakrabarty ruling's initial impact on the industry).
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CURRENT PATENT POLICY
A review of the relevant legal literature reveals scant mention of
evolutionary biology principles in the debate over animal and plant patents.
The following Sections briefly reconstruct the relevant scholarly history in
order to explain the reasons for the theory's exclusion and to provide
justifications for its inclusion in the modem debate over the patenting of
life.
A. Historical Origins of the Prohibition on Plant and Animal Patents
Patent law predates the recognized birth of evolutionary biology,
tracing its origins to English common law. The first English patent statute
was enacted in 1624.24 On the other hand, evolutionary biology was
virtually nonexistent until 1859, when Charles Darwin first published The
Origin of Species.25 Evolution is, therefore, a relatively modem scientific
concept, and the fusion of genetics and evolutionary theory is an even more
recent development. Thus, one could argue that the absence of evolutionary
biology in patent law is simply an issue of timing: Patent law could not
possibly have anticipated the innovations two centuries later in scientific
theory. But the relatively recent development of evolutionary biology does
not explain its continued exclusion from the legal doctrine.
Until 1930, patents on plants and animals were barred.26 This
prohibition rested on three philosophical assumptions. First, patents on
plants and animals would allow humans to hold exclusive rights to other
living organisms, an arrangement that seemed (and continues to seem)
immoral to many.27 Here the problem boils down to a very simple and
fundamental tenet of intellectual property law: Patent owners have the right
to control the license and use of all items listed in a patent. Thus, if
someone held a patent on Dachshund dogs, any person who wished to have
a Dachshund would need permission from the patent holder and would have
24. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 17. at 382 (discussing the history of the British Statute of
Monopolies).
25. DARWIN, supra note 18.
26. See O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 132 (1853) (holding natural principles or
discoveries to be unpatentable); Exparte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Comm'n Patent 123 (1889) (holding
plants to be unpatentable). There were a few exceptions to this rule. For example, Louis Pasteur
received a patent on a manufactured form of yeast in 1873. See PJ. Federico. Louis Pasteur's
Patents, 327 SCIENCE 86, 86 (1937). But such patents were extremely rare.
27. See, e.g., TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANtMAL RIGHTS (1983): PETER SINGER. ANIMAL
LIBERATION (2d ed. 1990); cf. VANDANA SHIVA, BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND
KNOWLEDGE 23 (1997) (arguing that patenting plants and animals is morally wrong because such
patents deny organisms their "self-organizing capacity" and "self-reproducing capacity"); PAUL
W. TAYLOR, RESPECT FOR NATURE: A THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS (1986) (espousing
the theory of "biocentric egalitarianism," which argues that all living creatures are morally
equal).
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to pay a licensing fee for the dog's "use." Further, the patent holder could
preclude everyone else from having a Dachshund. Arguably, the patent
owner could even prevent anyone from breeding Dachshunds-the most
extreme and troubling possibility. It is this broad, exclusive ownership that
has troubled many people. 8
Second, others argued that granting such patents would unjustly enrich
those who were simply the first to apply for a patent on a naturally
occurring organism.29 In this sense, patenting life would become a race to
the patent board, allowing the fastest applicant to exclude all others from
the use of a particular plant or animal. This objection raises a question of
equity: Is it fair that someone have exclusive rights to a natural product
when she has not done anything more than fill out a set of forms correctly?
Third, in an argument related to the second, some invoked a Lockean
philosophy of labor and just deserts in contending that live-organism
patents were inappropriate because they did not require the patent holders
to mix their labor with the naturally occurring item.3° Patents are rewards
for those who have invested their energy in innovation. If an individual
patents a product of nature, there is no innovation or work invested in its
development. Again, the patent process just becomes a meritless winner-
take-all race to the PTO. Thus, according to this critique, patent applicants
should have no claim to organisms that rightfully belong to nature. 31
Simultaneously, genetics and evolution were gaining attention through
rather infamous events. In 1925, creationism and evolution clashed in the
famous Scopes trial. Although creationism won at trial, the controversy
itself revealed the growing acceptance and credibility of evolution in
education.32 The late 1920s also saw the ugly growth of the eugenics
movement. Politicians and ideologues adopted the scientific language of
evolution and genetics to justify social stratification and oppression in
28. It should be noted here that these restrictions would be limited to the term of the patent,
which can vary under federal law.
29. See O'Reilly, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 132-33.
30. Cf. Baruch Brody, Should We Allow the Patenting of Life?, AGRIC. BIOETHIcs F., Aug.
1991, at 4 (arguing for patent rights as just deserts). For John Locke's original discussion, see
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 8-30 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ'g.
Co. 1980) (1690).
31. Arguably, the basic patent requirements themselves are founded on these same principles.
In most cases, it can be argued that the novelty requirement implicitly uses naturally occurring
items as a baseline for comparison. Presumably, anything that is novel must, at the very least, not
be found in nature. The utility requirement also relates to the fundamental principles by forcing
applicants to explain the use of the item under review. In other words, something that simply
exists naturally is not necessarily worthy of patent protection. For a discussion of the utility
requirement in biotechnology law, see Christopher A. Michaels, Biotechnology and the
Requirement for Utility in Patent Law, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 247 (1994).
32. See MICHAEL BARONE, OUR COUNTRY: THE SHAPING OF AMERICA FROM ROOSEVELT
TO REAGAN 25 (1990).
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society. Eugenics would later provide one of the key principles that Adolf
Hitler used to justify the Holocaust.'
It is against this backdrop that we may better understand the exclusion
of evolutionary biology in patent doctrine. First, evolution ran counter to
two millennia of biblical tradition and doctrine. Man was a creation in
God's image-not a natural product that evolved from apes. Second, the
political use of the theory had less-than-favorable results, leading many to
question the appropriateness of its application beyond the context of pure
scientific theory. Finally, the theory itself was still in its developmental
stages and did not have the widespread acceptance within the scientific
community that it enjoys today. Thus, it actually seems quite logical that
politicians, courts, and lawyers avoided the application of evolutionary
theory either as a means of denying patent protection to living organisms or
as the basis for a challenge to the existing doctrine. Put differently,
evolutionary biology may have been considered "taboo" during the early
period of the live-organism controversy; consequently, all parties to the
animal- and plant-patent debate steered clear of the negative stigma
attached to the concept.
35
B. Plant-Patent Legislation
In 1930, Congress, recognizing the impact that new technologies were
having on the breeding and cultivation of plants, passed the first Plant
Patent Act. 6 The Act lifted the absolute bar against issuing patents on
plants, but only for asexually reproducing plants and only in a narrowly
defined set of circumstances. In relevant part, the statute reads,
Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct
and new variety of plant, including cultivated spores, mutants,
hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other than a tuber-propagated
plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. '
33. See MIcHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANr, RACtAL FORMATION IN TiE UNIED STATES:
FROM THE 1960s TO THE 1990s, at 14-15 (2d ed. 1994).
34. See ADOLF HrrLER, MEIN KAMPF 284-96 (Ralph Manheim trans., Houghton Mifflin
1971) (1925) (arguing that the superiority of the Aryan race would lead to the eradication of Jews,
Gypsies, and the handicapped in the name of species purity).
35. Of course, there are a variety of other plausible reasons for the initial exclusion of
evolutionary biology from the discourse on plant patents. This hypothesis is one way of
explaining a common problem facing all policy issues that touch upon Darwinism and the
principles of evolution.
36. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (1994).
37. Id. § 161; see also U.S. PATENT & TRAtDEIARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINATION PROCEDURE § 1601 (15th rev. 1993) (providing a more detailed analysis of the
statute). The explicit exclusion of "tuber propagated plants" was a political distinction that
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Congress hoped that the Act would stimulate economic activity in the plant-
breeding industry,38 but the constraints on the subject matter stifled the
impact of the 1930 Act.
The Plant Patent Act has several structural problems that have hindered
the effective and accurate review of plant-patent applications. By limiting
patentability to asexually reproducing plants, Congress placed the focus of
the review process on the method by which the plants were bred and
cultivated. Asexual reproduction takes the form of clipping, grafting, or
budding.39 In some sense, plant patents became more akin to process
patents than to utility patents, which they were theoretically supposed to
parallel.4" Thus, it is not the organism itself that receives review but the
method of its creation.4' This result has had the effect of further reducing
the set of plants that are eligible for patent protection.
Despite its limited effect, the 1930 Act remains a significant event in
the historical development of plant and animal patents because it contains
the first set of legal rules that attempt to define a patentable, living
organism. In the Act's legislative history, distinctiveness is addressed as
follows: "The characteristics that may distinguish a new variety would
include, among others, those of habit; immunity from disease; or soil
conditions; color of flower, leaf, fruit or stems; flavor; productivity,
including everbearing quantities; perfume; form; and ease of asexual
reproduction." 42 The use of these criteria is a departure from the
pertained only to Irish potatoes and Jerusalem artichokes. See Nicholas J. Scay, Protecting the
Seeds of Innovation: Patenting Plants, 16 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 418, 420-21 (1989).
38. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 982 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
39. The Act also has had the effect of excluding seeds from patent protection because they
are the products of sexual reproduction.
40. See 35 U.S.C. § 161. Many of the animal and plant patents at issue in this Note also
appear to be process patents rather than standard utility patents. Defined simply, process patents
protect a novel procedure developed for the creation or production of a given item. See DONALD
S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 753 (1998). Utility patents protect a novel
product that is created for a particular use. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 17, at 458-59. The
difference between the types of patents is relevant to the future use and development of similar
organisms. A process patent protects only a procedure; consequently, others can make the same
product so long as they employ a different process. A utility patent, however, would temporarily
bar future developers from creating the same product, provided it is used for the same purpose.
For a detailed discussion of the distinctions between these two types of patents as used for
biotechnological products, see Seide & MacLeod, supra note 1I, at 381.
Given the nature of the judicial and administrative regime, animal and plant patents should
be a form of utility patent because the genetic engineering techniques themselves can be used to
produce multiple products that are not eligible for patent protection themselves. Yet given the
ethical and moral questions surrounding the subject matter, scientists may actually find it easier to
craft an application that describes the process, shifting attention away from the animal or plant
and toward a more objective procedure. See generally Breffni Baggot, Legislating a Transgenics
Revolution, INTELL. PROP. MAG., May 1998, at 371 (noting this possibility for animal-patent
applicants).
41. Cf. Brian C. Cannon, Toward a Clear Standard of Obviousness for Biotechnology
Patents, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 735 (1994) (proposing a review of biotechnological patents that
focuses on the nonobviousness of the process described in the patent application).
42. S. REP. NO. 71-315, at 1 (1930).
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requirements for standard utility patents, 3 but has formed the foundation
for the development of standards in the modem doctrine.
In 1952, Congress renewed and revised the Plant Patent Act along with
the general patent law. The Act has subsequently been amended on several
occasions and has been shaped through litigation," but the basic
requirements and rules remain the same. The Plant Patent Act remains the
standard by which the courts, the PTO, and legislators measure their
decisions related to the extension of patent protection to new species of
plants and animals. The Act, however, was found to be insufficient in at
least one respect.
In 1970, Congress passed the Plant Variety Protection Act' 5 (PVPA) as
a means of affording some exclusive rights to breeders of sexually
reproducing plants, thereby extending some limited protection to the large
number of plants excluded by the Plant Patent Act.6 The PVPA is
administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), not the PTO.
The USDA is authorized to issue a "Certificate of Plant Variety
Protection" that grants limited exclusive fights over certain types of
plants.
47
The qualifications for receiving a certificate roughly parallel the
requirements for an asexual plant patent.' But the protections under the
PVPA are substantially fewer than those provided by a patent. Certificate
holders are required to license their technology upon the reasonable request
of an interested party and have no blanket authority to exclude at will."' A
43. See Seay, supra note 37, at 421.
44. See, e.g., In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929 (C.C.P.A. 1962); Er pare -ibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 443 (Bd. Patent App. & Int. 1985).
45. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2582 (1994). The initial discussion that led to the development of the
PVPA was fostered by the establishment of the International Union for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants, an organization that oversaw the issuance of certificates to protect sced-
producing (that is, sexually reproductive) plants. Thus, it was changes in international law that
pressured the United States to alter its existing doctrine. This point underscores a more
fundamental problem in U.S. patent law: The rules and regulations in other countries can evolve at
a much faster pace than those of the United States. International legal concerns have been an
integral part of the debate over plant and animal patents; however, it is the United States that is
pressing forward at a rate that alarms the international intellectual-property community. See James
Buchanan, Between Advocacy and Responsibility: The Challenge of Biotechnology for
International Law, 1 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 221 (1994); Seay, supra note 37, at 423; Darrell G.
Dotson, Comment, The European Controversy over Genetic-Engineering Patents, 19 HOus. J.
IN'L L. 919 (1997).
46. As one commentator notes,
The technology of plant breeding had developed sufficiently between 1930 and 1970
that there was a generalized perception that new sexually reproduced varieties could be
replicated true-to-type in a way that was not thought possible in 1930. Sexually
reproduced varieties are non-hybrid varieties or cultivars that, for practical purposes,
breed true-to-form when self-pollinated.
Seay, supra note 37, at 423.
47. See 7 U.S.C. § 2483.
48. See Seay, supra note 37, at 424.
49. See 7 U.S.C. § 2404.
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mandatory exception to protection is granted for research use of any
certified plant." Also, there are specific statutory exemptions for the sale,
purchase, and distribution of seeds obtained from the certified plants."
Clearly, the certificates are designed to permit legitimate use in a scheme
similar to the "reasonable royalty" structure employed in other patent cases
and commonly used under copyright law. 2
Although these various congressional acts served as catalysts in the
extension of patent protection to plants and animals, they did little to
establish a well-defined set of rules and guidelines for subject-matter
review. By focusing on the wrong aspects of the living products-the
process by which they are created-or by establishing criteria that would
prove confusing when applied-a compulsory licensing scheme that cuts
against the ostensibly absolute sanctity of naturally occurring organisms-
Congress actually laid the faulty foundation upon which the PTO and the
courts would later construct today's problematic doctrine.
Further complicating this situation was the striking absence of scientific
analysis in the review process. As mentioned above, the social and political
climate in which Congress considered the 1930 Act did not favor
evolutionary biology. Thus, its omission in this period is not surprising.
Indeed, it was only after technological advancements in genetic research
during the 1960s that evolutionary biology gained complete acceptance in
the scientific academy. Yet the plant acts have remained devoid of any
mention of the theory, despite the changing attitudes toward the scholarship
and the opportunity for legislative revision. Evolutionary biology is the
framework within which we appreciate the importance of genetic
technology and understand the power of biotechnological research. Given
the importance of the acts, the theory's absence has, at least in part,
contributed to the confused doctrine by robbing policymakers and scholars
of a valuable perspective in the overall progress of the law and science.
C. Diamond v. Chakrabarty to the Present
Over the last two decades, litigation, rather than legislation, has molded
the law regarding plant and animal patents. A series of decisions by the
U.S. Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit served as the driving force that
led to the end of the absolute prohibition on animal and plant patents. In
50. See id. § 2544.
51. See id. § 2543.
52. For an example of a reasonable-royalty scheme in patent law, see Broadview Chem.
Corp. v. Loctite Corp., 311 F. Supp. 447 (D. Conn. 1970). For an example of the reasonable-
royalty scheme in copyright law, see Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp.,
562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
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Diamond v. Chakrabarty,53 the Court ordered the issuance of a patent for a
genetically engineered, oil-digesting bacterium-the first patent granted on
a nonbotanic living organism. The developers of the bacterium originally
sought a patent under the guise of a plant-patent application, claiming that
bacteria were not "animals" per se and that the developer's rights and
interests were analogous to those of plant breeders. The PTO denied the
application, holding merely that the Plant Patent Act did not consider
bacteria appropriate subject matter.
The Court agreed with the PTO's position regarding the exclusion of
bacteria from the Plant Patent Act. But the Court also agreed with the
applicants' argument that their bacterium was patentable subject matter, and
therefore ruled that the researchers had developed a process and a product
that were substantially different from the organism's progenitors found in
nature. The researchers' product was innovative and had value; therefore, it
qualified for protection. The Court, quoting the legislative history of the
1952 Patent Act renewal, wrote the now famous passage:
The relevant legislative history also supports a broad construction.
The Patent Act of 1793, originally authored by Thomas Jefferson,
defined statutory subject matter as "any new and useful art,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new or
useful improvement [thereof]." The Act embodied Jefferson's
philosophy that "ingenuity should receive a liberal
encouragement." Subsequent patent statutes in 1836, 1870, and
1874 employed this same broad language. In 1952, when the patent
laws were recodified, Congress replaced the word "art" with
"process," but otherwise left Jefferson's language intact. The
Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act inform us that
Congress intended statutory subject matter to "include anything
under the sun that is made by man." '
On the basis of this language, the Court not only allowed the bacteria
patent, but appeared to expand the universe of patent protection to any
product of man, even to animals that were man-made. Although bacteria are
quite different from multicellular animals, the Court's decision opened the
door to claims on other living organisms not explicitly included in the Plant
Patent Act. This case, together with the plant acts, forms the foundation for
the modem proposition that bioengineered organisms are no longer
presumptively barred from patent protection.
Subsequent to this ruling, numerous parties sought to claim exclusive
rights to other animals and previously unpatentable plants (or plant parts)
under the expanded scope of patent protection. The PTO and the Federal
53. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
54. Id. at 308-09 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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Circuit, working amid the uneasiness and uncertainty of the Court's ruling,
generally denied the patent applications, often resting their opinions on
details quite remote from the issue of patenting life. A series of cases
developed to test the boundaries of the law," and numerous special interest
groups, seeking to reverse the permissive trend toward patenting life,
entered the fray to challenge the policy's legal foundations.
In 1991, the Federal Circuit addressed the patentability question in dicta
in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg 6 In Quigg, the court held that an
organism, "given a new form, quality, properties or combination not
present in the original article existing in nature in accordance with existing
law," 57 could be patented. The court wrote further,
Accordingly, the Patent and Trademark Office is now examining
claims directed to multicellular living organisms, including
animals. To the extent that the claimed subject matter is directed to
a non-human "nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition
of matter-a product of human ingenuity," such claims will not be
rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 as being directed to nonstatutory
subject matter. 8
This holding has become the definitive statement on the patentability of
living organisms. Although the Federal Circuit never addressed the moral
and philosophical claims proffered by the plaintiffs in Quigg, the ruling has
served as the basis for granting animal patents to date. 9
But the Chakrabarty and Quigg courts made no attempt to elucidate
scientific standards that could be employed in reviewing plant and animal
patents. Perhaps the Justices and judges concluded that there was no need to
impose scientific standards or felt ill-equipped to make such a judgment. It
seems even more remarkable that in the opinions of the cases litigated in
the years between Chakrabarty and Quigg, jurists have made no statements
about, nor requests for, scientific data related to evolution theory-not even
in a footnote.6°
55. See In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (reviewing the patentability of
cyanobacteria); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (reviewing the
patentability of human genetic material); In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(reviewing the patentability of a protein-enhanced bacterium); In re Allen, No. 87-1393. 1988 WL
23321 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 14, 1988) (reviewing the patentability of oysters); Ex parte Hibberd, 227
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (Bd. of Patent App. & Int. 1985) (reviewing the patentability of seeds and
plant tissue).
56. 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
57. Id. at 923.
58. Id. (citations omitted).
59. Plant patents and certificates remain regulated by the Plant Patent Act and the PVPA.
60. Of course, it is impossible to know whether evolutionary biology was ever entertained as
a possible solution to the lack of standards. But no court appears to have called for its adoption or
even relied on its basic principles for guidance. Perhaps it has been considered or presented during
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In the wake of Quigg, the standards of patent review for living
organisms remain unclear. A backlog of applications and appeals has
accumulated at the PTO, and little has been done to solve the problem. The
PTO and the courts continue to work on a slow, inconsistent, case-by-case
basis. Given the rapid nature of the technology and the value to its potential
owners and the scientific community in general, these problems cannot
persist. Thus, a new set of standards must be developed to bring clarity to
the situation.
II. APPLICATION OF EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY
There are two facets of plant- and animal-patent technology that can be
probed and assessed through a test based on evolutionary biology: organism
development and species survival. As briefly mentioned in Part I, an
examination of these two areas will provide patent reviewers with
objective, quantifiable values that reveal the hand of man and allow for
comparisons between various applications. This Note proposes that the
integration of evolutionary biology take the form of a two-part inquiry. In
the first part of the test, applicants must show that the organism under
review would have little chance of developing naturally. In the test's second
part, applicants must also provide evidence that natural selection would
actually work against the organism but for the intervention of human
interest and technology. Only those organisms that satisfy both prongs of
the test would receive patent protection.
This proposal is a radical shift from the case-by-case analysis currently
employed by the PTO. The PTO appears to have avoided the establishment
of formal rules and standards by which it assesses the patentability of living
subject matter.6 ' As this Part will show, the absence of even the most basic
regulatory analytic structure has resulted in the issuance of a number of
questionable patents and a lack of predictable results in the application
process. For example, although patents on transgenic animals and plants are
commonly considered a form of utility patent, there are a number of patents
that actually describe processes of producing the animals and not the
oral arguments, but the absence of any reference at least accentuates its widespread omission in
the legal system.
61. At present, the PTO does not have a published circular discussing the standards of patent
review for nonhuman, multicellular organisms. In an informal discussion with several patent
officers regarding the standards that they employ when reviewing such patent applications, there
was no mention of a formal rule and only reference by analogy to animals that had already been
patented. Although informal rulemaking is inherent in the administrative legal regime, the lack of
formal rules and reliance on amorphous standards appear highly problematic given the
controversial nature of such patents.
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animals themselves.62 Some of this confusion can be traced to a lack of
clarity regarding the form that biotechnological patents should take.63
The two-part test proposed here responds to the current confusion by
adopting scientific standards to reveal the hand of man in "creating" these
organisms. It further attempts to confine the grant of patent protection to
those organisms that are so disfavored by natural selection that they must be
the products of human technology and not nature: They are effectively
man-made even if they are living organisms. The former goal is one of
simple efficiency and clarity. The latter goal is an attempt to create a self-
imposed limit on the scope of animal- and plant-patent protection-
something absent in the current regime.64 Although neither goal may be
fully reached, the following Sections seek to show, at the very least, how
the infusion of a few basic scientific principles can relieve some of the
uncertainty and anxiety in this controversial and politicized area of the law.
A. Organism Development
Evolutionary development is the measurable expression of genetic
progress. Phenotypic changes in the morphology and behavior of an
62. These patents describe processes that could be used to produce any number of different
types of transgenic animals. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,859,310 (Jan. 12, 1999) (patenting a
process to create transgenic animals used in tetracycline research); U.S. Patent No. 5,852,224
(Dec. 22, 1998) (patenting a process to prepare transgenic animals to produce human enzymes in
their milk); U.S. Patent No. 5,843,652 (Dec. 1, 1998) (patenting a process to produce transgenic
animals that carry a specific strand of human DNA important to diabetes research); U.S. Patent
No. 5,824,287 (Oct. 20, 1998) (patenting a process to produce transgenic animals that carry a
specific strand of human DNA important to cancer research); U.S. Patent No. 5,792,901 (Aug. 11,
1998) (patenting a process for using transgenic animals to detect prions in genetic tests); U.S.
Patent No. 5,625,126 (Apr. 29, 1997) (patenting a process that produces transgenic animals that
produce certain human antibodies). Thus, anyone using the methods described in these patents
could produce transgenic mice, dogs, cows, or sheep that express the same characteristic.
Arguably, it is the process and not the animal that deserves patent protection.
In addition, some patented processes produce transgenic animals only as a by-product. See,
e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,888,981 (Mar. 30, 1999) (patenting a process that produces transgenic
animals as a result of a test for the impact of certain chemicals on human proteins); U.S. Patent
No. 5,888,774 (Mar. 30, 1999) (patenting a process that produces transgenic animals as a result of
a test for the genetic expression of certain types of human proteins); U.S. Patent No. 5,876,949
(Mar. 2, 1999) (patenting a process that produces transgenic animals as a by-product of producing
certain human antibodies used in medical research); U.S. Patent No. 5,633,076 (May 27. 1997)
(patenting a process that produces transgenic bovines that produce protein-enhanced milk). Again,
these patents emphasize process over product.
63. See generally Baggot, supra note 40, at 371 (noting that a patent on an animal or plant
may describe the invention in several different ways).
64. Admittedly, this small step is taken in response to the ethical and moral criticism leveled
against plant and animal patents that, according to the discussion in Part I, was to be avoided in
this Note. This goal is mentioned here, however, to stress the superiority of this Note's proposal to
the current system. Simply having defined limits on the scope of a potentially powerful set of
rights is, objectively speaking, favorable to a system in which the boundaries are arbitrary. Thus,
the statement of this goal is not an attempt to legitimate the proposal in the eyes of those who
challenge the propriety of plant and animal patents. Rather, it is a statement in favor of formalism
in the patent-review process for live organisms.
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organism affect the rate of its natural selection; 65 consequently, genetic and
physical development is the dependent variable in the evolution equation.
Biotechnology seeks to control that variable by allowing researchers to
manipulate the evolutionary course of a given species.' Thus, an appraisal
of the level of human involvement in the development process is certainly
relevant to an assessment of the novelty, nonobviousness, and utility of a
given bioengineered animal or plant that are required under general patent
law. This evaluation constitutes the first part of this Note's proposed test.
Mutation is the most common natural reason for genetic change.'
Genetic variation within a species may also be the product of other factors,
such as genetic drift,' fission,' or adaptive polymorphism." The
probability of such naturally occurring events then becomes the baseline for
comparison in the proposed test. Although it may seem counterintuitive,
even genetically altered organisms have a calculable probability of
occurring naturally." The probability of such animals' developing may be
so low that it is, in reality, a statistical impossibility. In such instances, the
influence of biotechnology on the actual existence of the organism is
evidently too high to deny patent protection outright. Thus, under the
proposed test, probability of natural occurrence would be inversely related
to patentability.
The application of evolutionary biology in the patent-review process
offers the possibility of calculating the probability of an organism's natural
occurrence. By employing quantitative analyses from the subfields of
genetics and population ecology (discussed below), patent applicants could
undertake such calculations by using dozens of formulas or statistical
models that scientists have developed to evaluate the evolutionary
process." Their results could then be presented to the PTO for review.
There is no one equation or model that tells us the probability of an
organism's natural occurrence. Different tests or models apply to different
species in different environments. In fact, the proposed test would likely
65. See FUTtJYMA, supra note 20, at 146.
66. Or at least to open an alternative path of development unavailable in nature.
67. For a general discussion of the important role mutation plays in evolution. see
THEODOSIUS DOBZHANSKY, GENETICS AND THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 50-75 (3d ed. 195 1).
68. See FtJTUYMA, supra note 20, at 142-47.
69. See RONALD A. FISHER, THE GENETICAL THEORY OF NATURAL SELECTION 139-43 (2d
rev. ed. 1958).
70. See DOBZHANSKY, supra note 67, at 108-34.
71. Technically, there is always a possibility of an organism's occurrence given the random
and sometimes dramatic change caused by mutation.
72. For detailed discussions of such equations and models, see generally AYALA. supra note
20; DOBZHANSKY, supra note 67; FISHER, supra note 69; and FTUYIMA. supra note 20. For
example, the Hardy-Weinberg Law, an elementary theory of genetics, provides a foundation for
many of these calculations and would be a starting point for the statistical analysis of the patent
process. See AYALA, supra note 20, at 60-71. It is from such basic principles of scientific theory
that a quantitative analysis of natural selection and man-made evolution can begin.
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require a battery of calculations to support the "man-made"
characterization of a given organism. The results of these tests would be
measured against standards established by the PTO.
The use of PTO-established standards may raise doubts for some
people. If there is so much variation in the statistical modeling of evolution,
one might ask, how can any standards be established? This criticism is
certainly valid. Standards may have to be adjusted for different
environments or situations, but there is no reason the PTO could not
establish a set of standards for a variety of situations. In difficult and
unexpected cases, the patent reviewers could further adjust the scores to
ensure a fair assessment of the application. Although this may seem to
resemble the current case-by-case system, the two tests are quite different
for several reasons. First, evolutionary biology has identifiable standards
that provide some level of notice and expectation for patent applicants.
Second, this proposal employs a more formalistic procedure than the ad hoc
system that allows process to be considered in lieu of product. Third, the
proposed system uses objective, quantifiable methods as its foundation-
not subjective, amorphous concepts. Finally, it sets a clear bar that all
applicants must initially pass, which may lead to a reduction in the number
of patents filed and alleviate the mounting backlog in the system.
Upon surveying the patents already issued for bioengineered
organisms,73 we find that many meet this initial standard. For example, a
number of patented animals are the products of gene-splicing, in which
human DNA peptide strands are inserted into the genetic sequence of the
target organism.74 The probability of this occurring naturally is very low."
Genes of one species do not naturally splice into those of another. Most of
the already patented transgenic 76 animals have had a human gene inserted
within the DNA sequence.77 Under the evolutionary biology model, such
73. This Note can comment on only those patents that have been issued or that have been
openly discussed in the media. All patent applications and supporting material, as well as any
related PTO dispositions, are kept confidential to avoid any direct or inadvertent disclosure of
trade secrets. Thus, no comment on, or example of, patents recently denied by the PTO can be
offered.
74. See, e.g., patents cited infra note 97.
75. By definition, a species generally defines a group of common breeding. See FUTUYMA.
supra note 20, at 11. Thus, crossbreeding between most species, while not impossible, is
unlikely. Further, in certain instances, fundamental genetic coding makes the creation of
interspecies progeny impossible. See id. For example, one reason a mammal could not interbreed
with an insect is that the number of chromosomes do not match. Genetic splicing, however, allows
scientists to insert genetic codes from one animal to another, making the naturally impossible a
reality.
76. The term "transgenic" itself underscores the rarity of such an organism. Again, basic
biology principles dictate that organisms of different genuses cannot breed.
77. For general descriptions of such patents, see Landau, supra note 6; Sellers, supra note 6;
Greene, supra note 15; and Sally Lehrman, PTO Issues First r-DNA Animal Patents Since
Harvard Mouse, BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, Jan. 4, 1993, at 1.
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animals would be nearly impossible to find in the wild and, therefore, are
presumptively patentable.
Rather than engaging in rigorous scientific inquiry, however, the PTO
has approved dozens of other applications simply because the procedure by
which the organisms were created was novel or nonobvious to the average
individual working in the industry.78 Akin to the confusion inherent in the
process established by the Plant Patent Act, the lack of guidance in the
patent-application process for animals has led the PTO and the courts to
shift the focus away from substance and toward process. For example,
suppose a group of researchers were to alter the genotype of a rat to achieve
a specific phenotypic expression. When applying for their rat patent, they
describe the process by which it is created as being novel, but are legally
seeking protection for the rat itself. If the PTO issues the patent, the
researchers now have rights over both process and product, but have still
failed to explain how the rat itself is novel or nonobvious. 9 Under the
current system, the rat could be patented with such an incomplete and
flawed application. The existence of these types of patents' raises the
question of what exactly is being patented, which evokes the additional
question of what is patentable.
The evolutionary biology test avoids this trap by shifting attention away
from the production process. A showing of human intervention is required
to file for a patent in the first part of the test. This basic requirement
prevents the direct appropriation of naturally occurring organisms.8'
Although the methods the applicants use will have some bearing on the
quantifiable calculations, the evolutionary biology test does not assume that
a biotechnologically altered organism is inherently man-made. It goes a
step further to calculate and examine the probability of the organism's
natural development as part of the first prong of the proposed test.
The current patent system fails to recognize the possibility that the
same "new" organism could develop both in a laboratory and in the wild.
Organisms do not need to be the products of complex genetic manipulation
to receive protection under the current doctrine.' For example, plant
78. See, e.g., patents cited supra note 62.
79. This scenario, of course, assumes that the rat meets the utility requirements for patent
protection.
80. See, e.g., patents cited supra note 62.
81. To meet this requirement, an applicant would have to describe the process by which she
created the organism and provide evidence that the procedure is reproducible and consistent. This
statement may seem at odds with the contention that the evolutionary biology test shifts the focus
away from process and toward substance. In contrast to the current system, this prima facie
showing is not the only relevant factor. It is merely a way to prevent an applicant from attempting
to patent an uncatalogued organism found in the wild. Given Earth's immense biodiversity and
continual development, the possibility of such a fraudulent application is a relevant concern.
82- See Greene, supra note 15, at 17; Weiss, supra note 5: cf. John Woodley. Act Should
Permit Plant and Animal Parents, LAW. WKLY., Sept. 10. 1999, at 21 (noting that Canada does
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breeders often employ the "old-fashioned" process of cross-pollination to
create hybrids.83 Currently, these plants can and often do receive certificates
under the Plant Variety and Protection Act (PVPA). 4 Again, there is
inconsistency in the certificate-application process due to a misplaced focus
on the procedures used to create the plant, 5 but a survey of the issued
certificates reveals that crossbreeding is a common procedure used to create
new hybrids and variations of sexually reproductive plants. The
evolutionary biology test would reveal the PVPA's scope to be overbroad.
Population ecology, a subfield of evolutionary biology, examines the
ways in which reproductive processes, such as cross-pollination, operate in
nature. Studies have shown that cross-pollination occurs quite frequently in
nature and can take place over substantially long distances.86 Probabilities
of naturally occurring plant hybrids can be high relative to mutations. The
already existing analyses of population dynamics and natural reproductive
processes can be brought to bear upon the review of plant and animal
patents, possibly exposing organisms that are unworthy of patent (or
certificate) protection.
For example, the PTO has issued several patents for herbicide-resistant
plants.87 Such plants are generally the result of some form of
bioengineering-DNA splicing or resequencing. But these plants could
easily develop in the wild through exposure to the same regimen of
chemicals or through natural mutation.88 Herbicide resistance, for example,
is a common natural occurrence that does not require human intervention to
not permit patents on most non-biotechnologicaly developed animals that have long been
considered patentable material in the United States).
83. See Weiss, supra note 5.
84. See Eric M. Brain, Federal Legal Protection for Plants, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Dec.
1994, at 5.
85. The PVPA limits the certificate protection to plants created through sexual processes. In
most cases, such processes would involve cross-pollination techniques and selected breeding to
produce the desired result. In their basic form, these processes are no different from natural
reproduction, and some of these plants may actually occur in nature under the right conditions and
should, therefore, be excluded from patent protection.
86. For a general discussion of such natural occurrences, see SHERWIN CARLQUIST, HAWAII,
A NATURAL HISTORY: GEOLOGY, CLIMATE, NATIVE FLORA AND FAUNA ABOVE -TiE
SHORELINE (1980); and SHERWIN CARLQUIST, ISLAND BIOLOGY (1974).
87. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,955,361 (Sept. 21, 1999) (patenting a transgenic plant
resistant to herbicides, pesticides, pests, and pathogens); U.S. Patent No. 5,853,973 (Dec. 29,
1998) (patenting transgenic plants resistant to certain herbicides and pesticides); U.S. Patent No.
5,736,629 (Apr. 7, 1998) (patenting a transgenic variety of rice resistant to certain herbicides);
U.S. Patent No. 5,731,180 (Mar. 24, 1998) (patenting the process and plants resulting from the
insertion of a monocot gene sequence that fosters the development of pesticide-resistant strains for
cultivation).
88. One could liken this reasoning to that of the patent standard for nonobviousness. If we
consider nature as a participant in the industry of plant engineering, then the "invention" of a
pesticide-resistant strain may be quite obvious. Through mutation or simple desensitizing, plants
often grow resistant to chemicals over generations of breeding. Thus, because the plant is an
obvious result of natural development, it should not be considered an innovation and should not
receive patent protection.
1524 [Vol. 109: 1505
2000] Evolutionary Biology and Patent Law 1525
reach the same result. Although one could argue that technology allows for
the more rapid development of resistant strains or that genetic splicing
"creates" a species of flora that would never have developed in the wild,
the fact remains that there is a relatively high probability that nature's
course would produce an organism that expresses the same characteristics
as the bioengineered product. 9
The PTO has granted other patents on plants that actually occur in
nature. These plants are often the products of laboratory-induced mutation"
or selective breeding,9' but they are, in reality, the natural progeny of
natural organisms. 9' Under the proposed evolutionary biology test, these
plants would not receive patent protection, because their probability of
occurring in nature is too high for them to be characterized as man-made.
The application of evolutionary biology would prevent man from claiming
credit for creating something that nature would likely have achieved
anyway.
93
89. Further, it is unclear whether natural evolution would really take any longer than
bioengineering. Mutations occur in every generation of plant and, if they monitor the plants
correctly, breeders may well find resistant strains within one generation of the first use of any
chemical.
90. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,955,071 (Sept. 21, 1999) (patenting a fungal species for
biological control that was developed through a process of chemical exposure); U.S. Patent No.
4,761,373 (Aug. 2, 1988) (patenting a plant resistant to certain herbicides that was developed
through a process of excessive exposure to the chemicals).
91. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,962,772 (Oct. 5, 1999) (patenting a hybrid strain of maize that
was crossbred from mutants); U.S. Patent No. 5,959,185 (Sept. 28, 1999) (patenting a strain of
soybean that was the product of selective breeding); U.S. Patent No. 5,936,148 (Aug. 10, 1999)
(patenting an inbred strain of maize resistant to certain plant disease); U.S. Patent No. 5,198,599
(Mar. 30, 1993) (patenting a strain of lettuce that developed pesticide resistance through selective
breeding); U.S. Patent No. 5,013,659 (May 7, 1991) (patenting a pesticide-resistant strain of
tobacco produced from crossbreeding mutants).
92. One could argue that even plants bred and selected for their resistance to man-made
chemicals are man-made. How could they have developed but for the application of pesticides and
herbicides? But this argument is only half correct. The plant's exposure to pesticides and
herbicides reveals the mutant strains' resistance, but it is unclear whether the exposure led to the
resistance. See FUrtnMA, supra note 20, at 76. Mutations occur constantly in nature. In contrast
to such genetic techniques as splicing or recombination, it is difficult to tell whether the mutation
was natural or a reaction to a particular chemical. This uncertainty does not mean that all plants
resistant to pesticides should be presumptively barred from patent protection, only that the
issuance of such patents should be highly suspect, given the common occurrence of resistant
mutant strains in the wild.
93. One could argue that this characterization of such patents conflates genotype and
phenotype. This may very well be true. Two plants may exhibit the same trait (phenotype)-
pesticide resistance, for example-but have different DNA coding (genotype). But the
evolutionary biology proposal is about relative probabilities of natural occurrence. Thus, genetic
manipulation may produce the same expressed trait, but this does not mean that the trait is most
likely to occur exclusively in a laboratory, nor does it even support the claim that such a trait is
more likely to be produced through DNA splicing. If a natural process (natural selection) has a
relatively high probability of producing the same result, then the evolutionary biology test would
deny patent protection. In this sense, the more likely the phenotypes appear through both natural
and artificial processes, the lower the chances of the artificial product receiving a patent.
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The evolutionary biology test allows for analysis in other situations.
Beyond ecological and genetic factors, behavioral characteristics can be
included in the analysis.94 The interaction of other environmental factors
can be anticipated in the calculations, allowing for a more comprehensive
study of the natural development of a particular organism. Thus, the
evolutionary biology test is an improvement on the current system not just
because of the objective standards of review it offers, but also because it
allows for a more complete analysis of the factors that can determine the
novelty and utility of an organism influenced by human technology.
B. Species Survival
Natural selection is at the core of the evolutionary biology test.
Darwin's innovation revolutionized the way that population dynamics and
species-survival rates were conceptualized. When combined with the
scientific art of genetic technology, the theory works to explain much of the
development of the natural world through quantifiable values and by
employing objective techniques. Whereas the developmental analysis
discussed above asks if a bioengineered organism would appear in nature,
the survival analysis presented here asks: Even if such an organism had a
low probability of occurring in nature, what would happen if it were
introduced into the wild?
The application of natural selection theory is simple. Again, if we
assume that the organism for which a patent is sought satisfies the first
prong of the evolutionary biology test, a selection rate can be calculated for
the new organism. 95 The analysis takes two forms. First, the organism's
natural-selection rate can be determined and compared to other plants and
animals-an interspecies comparison. This figure would represent the
potential for survival and propagation of the desired trait in the wild relative
to other bioengineered organisms. Such a calculation should include
variables such as the favorable characteristics of the trait in particular
environments, interaction of the questioned trait with other possessed traits,
and the genetic probability of the trait's expression. As in the first prong of
this test, the PTO or the courts could set general threshold values for plants
94. Animal behavior can play a significant role in the survival rate of a mutant organism. For
many species, behavior is a vital element in the mating process. See FUTUYMA, supra note 20, at
231. Those organisms that fail to exhibit the appropriate behavior, whether ritualistic or
morphological, may be selected against by potential mates. Thus, a mutant may fail to persist
beyond one generation in nature due to its failure to satisfy the behavioral requirements of its
progenitor species. See id. at 76 (discussing deleterious mutations).
95. For examples of selection-rate calculations, see AYALA, supra note 20, at 87-116; and
FISHER, supra note 69, at 22-51. As with the formulas and models for calculating natural
occurrence cited above, there is no single equation that would work for all species in any
environment. Thus, the PTO must again make some effort to tailor the standards and methodology
of review to the subject matter for which the patent is sought.
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and animals that would serve as the bar for patent viability. Thus, the
organism's natural-selection rate would be compared relative to a
predetermined general standard. This approach, however, would be
insufficient because it fails to recognize that different types of plants and
animals lend themselves better to genetic manipulation or possess
complementary traits that may increase the selection index.'
Given the limited nature of the general standard comparison, it is more
accurate to conduct the inquiry on an individualized basis. A self-contained,
intraspecies comparison would avoid the variances between organisms by
requesting the calculation of what may be termed the natural- and the
human-selection rates. The natural-selection rate would be the survival
probability rate in the wild. The human-selection rate would quantify a
plant's or animal's survival rate under its current condition. In most cases,
the environment of a bioengineered animal would be a laboratory. The
human-selection rate would emphasize the human preferences. If the
human-selection rate is higher than the natural-selection rate, a patent could
be justified on the grounds that the organism has benefited from some
advantage afforded to it on the basis of its utility to humans. Put differently,
the organism would die in the wild but continues to exist through human
intervention.
For example, the PTO has granted patents on several transgenic animals
that are either susceptible to certain diseases at a higher-than-average rate
or born with genetic defects that mirror adverse human health conditions.'
96. For example, flowering plants generally have two important features that dctermine their
natural-selection rates: scent and coloring. One or both of these traits determine the plants'
success in attracting the appropriate type of insect for pollination. Flowers that bloom at night are
normally white and require strong odors to attract nocturnal pollinators, but flowers that bloom
during the day are more likely to use color and floral patterns to entice insects. If someone were to
bioengineer a night-blooming flower with color, the new trait would likely have little effect on its
selection rate because many of the insects that pollinate at night are colorblind. Insects sensitive to
color may be attracted to the flower during the day, but the flower blossoms would be closed.
rendering the added attention useless. Thus, the selection rate of the night-blooming plant would
be unchanged. But if a day-blooming flower were to add scent and alter its color, there may
actually be a substantial increase in its selection rate as a result of the added attention it would
receive during its primary reproductive period. For a more detailed discussion of the interaction of
insect behavior and plant morphology, see generally A.D. IMMS. INSECT NATURAL HISTORY
(Bloomsbury Books 1990) (1947). Assuming that the PTO did not distinguish between night- and
day-blooming plants, the day-blooming plants would experience a higher change in their selection
rate than would the night-blooming plants, even though both had gone through substantial
changes in their genotypic and phenotypic makeup.
97. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,859,308 (Jan. 12, 1999) (patenting a transgenic animal that
overproduces certain chemicals that cause the animal to be more susceptible to the ill effects of
stress); U.S. Patent No. 5,789,655 (Aug. 4, 1998) (patenting a transgenic mouse that lacks certain
protein genes, resulting in imnmunodeficiency); U.S. Patent No. 5.789,654 (Aug. 4. 1998)
(patenting transgenic animals that are genetically predisposed to obesity); U.S. Patent No.
5,777,194 (July 7, 1998) (patenting a mouse genetically expressing symptoms of Alzheimer's
disease); U.S. Patent No. 5,777,193 (July 7, 1998) (patenting a transgenic mouse containing cells
that have a higher susceptibility to carcinogens); U.S. Patent No. 5.709.844 (Jan. 20, 1998)
(patenting a transgenic animal that readily contracts cancer); U.S. Patent No. 5,698.766 (Dec. 16,
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These animals are often used in medical research to examine certain aspects
of a disease or the animal's reaction to drugs under development for a new
treatment. Natural selection would theoretically work against such
creatures. A genetically altered mouse that manifested symptoms similar to
degenerative Alzheimer's 98 or a rat that suffered from a predetermined
immunodeficiency" would not fare well in the wild. The expression of
these genetic predispositions would not persist, as a result of naturally
selective breeding."°
Under the evolutionary biology test, these organisms should receive
patent protection because they exist contrary to the tendency of natural
selection. The force resisting nature is humankind; therefore, the organism
could be considered nonnatural and the product of human technology. To
use the appropriate terminology, the natural-selection rate is lower than the
human-selection rate. In nature, these organisms would have a near-zero-
percent survival rate, which would lead to a near-zero-percent expression of
the relevant trait in nature. Even with human intervention, these animals
have a near-zero-percent survival rate, but their very existence denotes an
expression rate higher than what would be expected in nature."'
Other transgenic animals are developed for similar purposes, but these
would not meet the requirements of the survival inquiry. For example, some
organisms are bioengineered to include a genetic marker that expresses a
specific trait under defined conditions."2 These markers are used to detect
1997) (patenting transgenic animals that are prone to manifesting eating disorders leading to
epileptic seizures); U.S. Patent No. 5,675,060 (Oct. 7, 1997) (patenting a transgenic mouse that is
genetically predisposed to arthritis).
98. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,877,399 (Mar. 2, 1999); U.S. Patent No. 5,850,003 (Dec. 15,
1998); U.S. Patent No. 5,811,633 (Sept. 22, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 5.612,486 (Mar. 18, 1997):
U.S. Patent No. 5,387,742 (Feb. 7, 1995).
99. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,859,312 (Jan. 12, 1999); U.S. Patent No. 5,530,179 (June 25,
1996); U.S. Patent No. 5,489,742 (Feb. 6, 1996); U.S. Patent No. 5,434,340 (July 18. 1995); U.S.
Patent No. 5,175,384 (Dec. 29, 1992).
100. Natural selection could take several different forms in this context. First, the organism
could simply die without ever breeding, thereby precluding any chance of the passing of its
genetic trait to another generation. See AYALA, supra note 20, at 98-99. Second, no other member
of its species might be willing to breed with the organism, because of its poor health or some
potential change in its behavior. See FUTUYMA, supra note 20, at 268-71. Finally, if the trait were
recessive, population genetics might simply cause the trait to disappear from the gene pool
because of a lack of interbreeding between creatures carrying the recessive trait. See AYALA,
supra note 20, at 71-78. Under any one of these scenarios, the trait would be disfavored by natural
selection and, therefore, would fail to persist in nature.
101. To cast this argument in a different light, one could say that these animals would exist
only in a laboratory. Without human intervention, they would die and so too would the
characteristic for which humans valued their existence. This recasting of the argument can provide
some response to the prevalent fear of many biotechnology opponents that patented animals
would be produced in large quantities and escape into the wild where they would adversely affect
delicate ecosystems. Cf. Warren D. Woessner, Patenting Life: Transgenic Animals, INTELL. PROP.
TODAY, Dec. 1994, at 8 (noting a growing concern over the release of bioengineered animals into
the wild).
102. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,625,123 (Apr. 29, 1997) (patenting transgenic animals that
are used to screen for substances that enhance certain types of transcriptional activity); U.S. Patent
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the presence of certain chemical compounds and, in some cases, evaluate
their effects on the organism. Although these organisms may not be
naturally occurring, their survival rates are often unaffected by their
exposure to human technology. They are not created with fatal health
problems, nor do these tests ultimately lead to their death. These organisms
merely have a quality that is useful to humans but creates little difference
between their human- and natural-selection rates. Such animals do not
deserve patent protection under the evolutionary biology test."
Such self-contained comparisons create a tension within the patent
regulatory process at several levels. First, one could argue that certain
nonengineered plants and animals may also express a similar gap between
natural- and human-selection rates. Arguably, any cultivated plant or
domesticated animal enjoys inflated population levels and selection rates as
a result of its value to humanity.'0 4 Endangered species are even better
examples of such naturally occurring organisms that are sustained by
humans. For instance, the California condor would be extinct but for the
intervention of humanity. 5 Under the survival analysis, the condor and
other protected species could meet the requirements for the second prong of
the evolutionary biology test. But these organisms would not meet the
developmental requirements of the test's first prong. The condor is not a
product of bioengineering, nor is there a gene-altering process that
scientists employ to increase the propagation of the species. Thus, because
such creatures do not satisfy the standards of analysis under both prongs of
No. 5,589,155 (Dec. 31, 1996) (patenting a transgenic animal that detects mutagenic compounds);
U.S. Patent No. 5,347,075 (Sept. 13, 1994) (patenting transgenic animals that react to certain
mutagenic chemicals).
103. One could liken such animals to research instruments, which often receive patent
protection. But such an argument would fail to satisfy the requirement that the organisms are, in
some sense, "man-made." These creatures are not the equivalent of a gas spectrometer or a
centrifuge. They are merely the medium through which a test is performed. One need not patent
the entire organism, because it is the DNA strand that is the important element in these organisms
(given that the gene is often not host-specific). Thus, they are more akin to the paper on which a
reactive chemical is placed (for example, a litmus-paper or a blood-blot test) than to the chemical
itself.
104. Cats or some species of dogs would probably not experience such high population levels
if they faced the same forces of natural selection as their wild cousins, such as bobcats or coyotes.
One could argue that domesticated animals have been " engineered" because they have been
trained to serve human masters. But such conditioning neither alters an animal's genetic code nor
creates a new organism. For example, the basic genetic sequences of a wild and domesticated
horse are identical. Thus, such domesticated animals would be barred from patent protection
because they would fail the first prong of the evolutionary biology test.
105. For a discussion of the project to restore the California condor population, see DAVID
DARLINGTON, IN CONDOR COUNTRY: A PORTRAIT OF A LANDSCAPF, ITS DENIZEN S. AND ITS
DEFENDERS (1987). For a broader discussion of human intervention and influence regarding
endangered species, see ROGER L. DISILVESTRO, THE ENDANGERED KINGDOM: THE STRUGGLE
TO SAVE AMERICA'S WILDLIFE (1991). Ironically, the endangered species. like the condor, would
probably be thriving were it not for human development polluting their environments.
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the evolutionary biology test, the organisms fail to meet the standards for
patentable subject matter.
Second, patent law is fundamentally based on the economic tenet that
the potential value of exclusive rights encourages public disclosure of
research and development, fostering a more efficient market. "' Human-
selection rates are inherently influenced by these economic considerations.
Some may view the use of a human-selection rate as immoral because it
allows economic value to drive environmental management through the
patent process. Others may argue that a human-selection standard cannot be
compared to the natural-selection rate because economics does not have a
bearing on survival rates. But these criticisms would miss the mark. If
economic considerations inflate the value of an organism otherwise ill-
suited for survival, then that result supports the notion that the plant or
animal is more like a product of human technology than of natural
evolution. At a more theoretical level, economic considerations are
themselves constructs of humankind. Thus, the more influence that
economics has in the choice of "developing" a particular plant or animal,
the more impact humans will have in the propagation of a given organism.
Economic influence is, therefore, merely one valuable factor in the analysis
of an organism's patentability.
Third, technology may cause the natural-selection rate for a transgenic
species to increase to a level that matches or surpasses its human-selection
rate. Should this reverse effect occur, one could argue that the selection-rate
comparisons would be devoid of probative value. But natural selection
theory itself, in conjunction with population ecology, holds the response to
this challenge. There exists a theoretical assumption in evolutionary biology
that the maintenance of diversity and ecological competition benefits all
species. °7 Put differently, evolution actually does not promote the absolute
dominance of one plant or animal species above all others in a given region
or class of organisms. When such a dominant species develops, often there
is a disruption in the ecological balance of the system that leads to either the
collapse of the entire ecosystem or a lack of genetic diversity that weakens
the dominant species."°8 When a species declines, mutations are favored
(thereby increasing diversity again), or the species simply falls into
extinction. Thus, a man-made plant or animal could also be identified on
the basis of selection-rate comparisons within an ecological model that
reveals the self-destructive nature of the species.
106. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 17, at 15-21.
107. See DOBZHANSKY, supra note 67, at 69-70 (discussing the deleterious effects of
inbreeding); EHRLICH & EHRLICH, supra note 20, at 16-32 (discussing the importance of diversity
to the prevention of extinction); Paul R. Ehrlich, The Loss of Diversity: Causes and
Consequences, in BIODIVERSITY, supra note 20, 24-25 (discussing biodiversity more generally).
108. See works cited supra note 107.
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Finally, one could argue that the comparison of the two rates is
inaccurate because the rates may not act in concert. What is a benefit in the
wild, from a basic environmental standpoint, may be a detriment when
human preference and interference are considered. For example, a coffee
plant biologically engineered to produce beans with higher concentrations
of caffeine, or a genetically altered tobacco plant with higher levels of
nicotine, would most likely be selected for contradictory reasons in the
natural and human contexts. Caffeine and nicotine are natural defenses in
the wild, but they are chemicals desired for human consumption. This
paradox has the effect of increasing both the natural- and human-selection
rates."t° In these cases, it is perhaps best to take a step back from the rates
themselves and examine the underlying causes of the awkward result. If
different causes for the two rate increases are identified, this result would
only support the patentability of the organism.
Natural selection theory is an elegant and simple concept that welcomes
the use of other evolutionary biology principles. In applying this proposed
test to patent applications, one could consider the first prong-organism
development-as the test for novelty and the second prong-survival
examination-as the test for utility, thereby indirectly applying the correct
standards required by the U.S. Code." ' The use of this test weeds out
applications for patents on naturally occurring organisms that are masked
by the applicant's description of a man-made process, while rewarding
innovation and acknowledging the possibility of nonnaturally occurring
organisms.
IV. CONCLUSION
The evolutionary biology test offers a set of functionally simple rules to
evaluate plant and animal patents. It employs quantifiable standards that are
consistent with the practices of science and ultimately beneficial to the
operation of law. The theory's underlying principles are logical, and, like
other types of scientific inquiry, the proposed test encourages consistent
and reproducible results. As the PTO and the courts struggle to keep pace
with developments in biotechnology and genetic research, processual
clarity must become the primary goal of the law of animal and plant
109. This paradox exists for many cultivated plants and domesticated animals. A trait that
would normally protect the organism in the wild makes it more valuable to humans, which in turn
has a detrimental impact on the survival of the plant or animal. The wild asset becomes a
domesticated liability. Ornamental plants are also examples of this paradox. A vibrantly colorful
flower would be an advantage in the wild, but if humans often picked this flower, thereby
terminating its reproductive life cycle, the beneficial trait would then become a detriment to the
plant.
110. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164(1994).
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patents. Such a goal can be satisfied only by shifting the law toward a more
uniform and objective doctrine.
The proposal offered here is an attempt to add formality and legitimacy
to the application process for patents on animals and plants. The current
system has little of either, but rather stretches outdated legal principles to
cover new scientific problems. The simple process that worked for bacteria
and tubers is ill-suited for tackling the complexities of transgenic mice or
cross-mutated corn. Arguably, if patent law cannot deal with the
bioengineered organisms of today, it is most certainly unprepared for the
technological advances that lie just over the horizon in the twenty-first
century.
As noted in Part I, for example, the PTO currently faces a difficult test
case regarding a pending appeal of a denied patent application for
chimeras-organisms that are half-human and half-animal. The PTO
recently rejected the chimera application on the basis of the government's
moral ban on patenting human life, but this justification is suspect at best."'
As many point out, the PTO regularly grants patents on transgenic animals
containing spliced human DNA. These creatures often express human
characteristics, such as human hormones or other chemicals that the animal
would not produce in nature.' 2 Thus, it appears the PTO's ban is not
absolute, and its justification is faulty, leaving the PTO with practically no
legal grounds upon which it could deny the chimera patent.
Although the fate of the chimera application appears destined for
resolution by the courts, the controversy presents an interesting opportunity
to show the superiority of the evolutionary biology test to the current case-
by-case system." 3 First, it would appear that the likelihood of such a
111. This rule is grounded in the Thirteenth Amendment's ban on slavery. See U.S. CONsT.
amend. XIII. To own any part of a human being would be a form of slavery and therefore
unconstitutional.
112. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,850,000 (Dec. 15, 1998) (patenting a transgenic cow that
produces certain beneficial human proteins in its milk); U.S. Patent No. 5,849,992 (Dec. 15. 1998)
(patenting a transgenic cow that produces milk containing human antibodies); U.S. Patent No.
5,750,176 (May 12, 1998) (patenting transgenic mammals that produce certain human biological
compounds in their milk); U.S. Patent No. 5,716,817 (Feb. 10, 1998) (patenting transgenic
mammals that produce a human biochemical that has medicinal properties for infants); U.S. Patent
No. 5,700,671 (Dec. 23, 1997) (patenting transgenic mammals that produce human
oligosaccharides and glycoproteins in their fatty tissues); U.S. Patent No. 5,661,016 (Aug. 26,
1997) (patenting a transgenic animal that produces various heterologous antibodies in its milk):
U.S. Patent No. 5,633,425 (May 27, 1997) (patenting a transgenic animal that produces human
antibodies in its milk); U.S. Patent No. 5,545,806 (Aug. 13, 1996) (patenting transgenic animals
that produce human heterologous antibodies).
113. Before we begin this analysis, there is one limitation that must be made clear: There are
no chimeras presently available for evaluation. The applicants, two scientists opposed to the
patenting of any life, want the patent so that they may personally control the technology and
prevent any other person from using it for ill-conceived ends (at least during the life of the patent).
Their moral apprehensions, however, have prevented them from actually engineering such a
creature. Thus, there is no organism to which we may refer or evaluate under the evolutionary
biology test. See Salkin, supra note 13.
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chimera's natural occurrence is very low." 4 Again, the genetic and physical
differences between humans and other animals prevent such a creature from
developing through natural breeding."5 Thus, the first part of the inquiry
would be satisfied. However, the potential of the organism's survival
remains unclear. Here, the lack of an actual chimera hinders conclusive
analysis, but the advantages of evolutionary biology remain unaffected.
Assuming that the chimera could reproduce sexually with one or both
of its progenitor species," 6 then the inquiry would shift to the influence of
the creature's new characteristics on its human- and natural-selection rates.
A multitude of factors can affect the ratio between these two survival
indexes, preventing any definitive conclusion regarding the patentability of
such creatures at this time. There are, however, several potential
conclusions that we can tentatively draw.
On the one hand, there is a relatively high probability that nature may
actually favor a chimera's existence rather than select against it. Animals
that have some enhanced intellectual capabilities might maintain a
relatively high natural-selection rate, leading to the survival and flourishing
of their genotype. In this case, a pig with a human mind would have an
advantage over regular pigs. On the other hand, normal pigs might not
select for intelligence, making it a disfavored trait and contributing to the
chimera pig's demise. As previously discussed, the human pig might also
be overly selected, leading to the collapse of the overall species of pig.""
When such chimeras are compared to humans, it is equally unclear what
difference there would be between the human- and natural-selection rates.
Both rates involve human preferences, which could shift the direction of
selection.
Despite the uncertainty in knowing the effect that genetic engineering
will have on a chimera's selection, it appears likely that there will be some
difference between a chimera's selection and that of its progenitor species.
114. The patent application apparently does not describe exactly the organism that would be
produced. The application's contents are often discussed in terms of its process and not its
product, even though it is the product that has sparked the controversy. Thus, we must refer to the
organism in the abstract rather than giving it a specific name or set of characteristics.
115. For example, it is highly unlikely that the chromosomes would match in number and
natural pairing. See G. LEDYARD STEBBINS, DARWIN To DNA, MOLEcULES TO HutMaNrr- 90-98
(1982). Animal behavior and simple morphology also prevent different species from
interbreeding, even if progeny were a genetic possibility. See id. at 91.
116. According to reproductive biology principles, many animals that are a combination of
two similar species are unable to reproduce. See id. at 94-98. For example, mules, the offspring of
a horse and donkey, are sterile from birth. See id. at 91-92. If this general principle holds true for
chimeras, the probability that its morphology would persist beyond one generation is a near
impossibility unless human DNA is combined with that of an asexually reproducing animal.
Excluding that possibility, such a chimera would likely pass both prongs of the test and be eligible
for patent protection. But given that chimeras are transgenic creatures, there is an even greater
possibility that they can reproduce inasmuch as such things may be controlled through genetic
manipulation.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 107-108.
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The application of evolutionary biology gives policymakers the flexibility
to tailor established standards to the demands of various organisms, rather
than processing applications through an ad hoc and unpredictable system.
Under this regime, the requisite difference between natural- and human-
selection rates for chimeras might be higher than that for a transgenic
mouse." 8 The PTO could, in effect, combine its commentary on the
morality of patenting human life with the standards of evolutionary biology.
This system would establish a limit to the extent to which researchers could
harness the power of biotechnology, while still allowing for the
development of transgenic organisms that contained human DNA. The end
result would be a set of quantifiable scientific standards that could be
tempered by human ethics--quite possibly the most responsible and
effective means of addressing such powerful technology." 9
The scientists who filed the chimera patent did so in an attempt to raise
awareness of this looming question in patent law and to pressure
policymakers into at least developing a set of formal rules regarding the
patenting of animals. 2 ' The PTO responded with dicta from an outdated
common-law case. If we are to maintain a system of animal and plant
patents that is both legitimate and efficient, a new analytical paradigm is
needed. This new system must use the principles of science to its advantage
rather than fear the intricacies of its application. The introduction of
evolutionary biology into the patent-application process is a step toward
that new paradigm. Although this proposal may not be the perfect answer to
all the epistemological questions about the plant- and animal-patent system,
it represents a tangible and comparatively advantageous improvement upon
the amorphous regime in place today.
118. It should, however, be reasonably calculated, recognizing the possibility that there may
be some limited circumstances in which society may benefit from the development of such
creatures.
119. Even those who criticize the very notion of patenting life must realize that prohibiting
such patents will not stop researchers from developing the technology. Although the potential
profits from biotechnology may accelerate the process, there is nothing to prevent a person from
creating a chimera. In the absence of patent protection, there is also no way of controlling the
proliferation of the technology. Opponents of such patents must ask themselves whether it is the
mere thought of owning life that is abhorrent or a more fundamental uneasiness with the
technology that is the problem. Attacking patent law addresses the former concern but has little
effect on the latter.
120. The chimera concept does not include half-human, half-plant creatures. Thus, it is
concerned only with the animal-patent process.
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